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BOOK REVIEWS
THE

DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC

FREEDOM IN THE UNITED

STATES. By Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xvi, 527. $5.50.
Academic freedom has become one of the foremost issues of
our time, and during the last decade much has been written and
published on the subject.' One of the most recent and important
additions to this literature is the volume under review. It is one
of the studies of the American Academic Freedom Project established at Columbia University in 1951 through the initiative and
generosity of Louis M. Rabinowitz. The project was placed under
the direction of the distinguished political philosopher, Robert
M. MacIver and was divided into two parts, the report of each
having now been published as a separate volume. The first study
is a historical survey, the work of Professors Hofstadter and
Metzger of the History Department of Columbia University.
At the outset it seems safe to say that this is the first comprehensive treatment of the development of academic freedom in
this country. The authors have avoided the natural temptation to
make this a running account of the leading cases involving violations of freedom. This is commendable, for the story of academic
freedom is more than one of academic suppression. It is important
to know why freedom exists and why it has been limited. The
authors have sought to show "what freedom has meant to successive generations of academic men, to what extent they have
achieved it, and what factors in academic life itself, as well as
in American culture at large, have created and sustained it."
Despite an admitted prejudice on behalf of freedom of thought
the authors have achieved a surprisingly detached and fair-minded
presentation of the "history of academic man and the complex
circumstances under which he has done his work."
Although the volume is a collaborative effort it is divided into
two distinct parts, each of the authors having assumed full responsibility for his part of the text. Part One by Hofstadter is
'For a selected bibliography on academic freedom see that given by Robert M.

MacIver at the end of his book, ACADEMIC

FRUDOM IN OUR TIME

complete it has most of the significant articles and books.

(1955). While not
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chiefly concerned with the American college down to the period
immediately following the Civil War, an age overshadowed by
religious and theological questions. Part Two deals with the
modern American university in a period preoccupied with science
and social problems. As a background for the treatment of academic freedom in this country Chapter I introduces us to some
phases of the history of intellectual freedom in the universities
of Western Europe prior to the Reformation. The other four
chapters of Part One deal with a period when colleges were under
denominational control and the problem of academic freedom,
as we understand it today, was hardly posed. This situation existed
for the reason that the sponsors of such colleges, in the main, did
not intend that there should be any significant degree of freedom,
and the men who taught in the colleges seemed to have had, for
the most part, only the slightest aspirations toward intellectual
freedom. Not only did the pre-Civil War denominational colleges
fail to accord an adequate measure of freedom to those who
taught in them, but far worse, their sponsors and promoters sabotaged and crippled attempts by others to establish freer and more
advanced institutions. The authors are quick to point out, however, that some of the same religious sects that opposed academic
freedom a hundred years ago have in recent years produced some
of its most articulate spokesmen. Chapter III deals with the distinctive system of collegiate education which had emerged in the
American colonies by the middle of the eighteenth century. Its
three unique features of denominational sponsorship, lay govern.
ment, and lack of connection with professional or advanced faculties had important consequences with respect to the status, freedom
and initiative of teachers.
While the scope of the project is broad indeed the authors have
not touched all aspects of the subject. They have been primarily
concerned with the freedom of faculty members and even here
have confined themselves to those teaching in colleges and uni.
versities.2 The authors have dealt with freedom for students only
where this issue has converged with that of freedom of teachers.
It is interesting to note, however, that in the early American
2 Those interested in the history of the freedom of teaching in secondary schools
are referred to two volumes by Howard K. Beale. A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEAcHINc
IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1941); ARE AMERICAN TEACHERS FREE (1936).
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college freedom of thought as a consciously expressed objective
appeared first as religious freedom for students. In a chapter
entitled "Religion, Reason and Revolution," we find a discussion
of narrow sectarianism at Yale, especially during the regime of
Thomas Clap, and a treatment of liberalism at Harvard under
the Unitarians.
The final chapter of Part One (Chapter V) covers the Old
Time College during the first sixty years of the nineteenth century.
Here is an account of what is termed the great retrogression in
the state of collegiate education brought about primarily by the
indiscriminate establishment under denominational sponsorship
of numerous and scattered small colleges fostering narrow sectarian doctrine instead of developing further the substantial and
altogether adequate number of institutions which were in existence. A contributing factor to this educational backsliding was,
however, the repression both in the North and South on the slavery
issue. To many readers this will prove the most interesting chapter
of Part One. It contains a discussion of a number of the most
celebrated cases of religious and community interference with
educational administration and professorial freedom. In Kentucky
the small but dominant clergy group, the Presbyterians, succeeded
in driving Horace Holley, a Unitarian and a distinguished educator, from the presidency of Transylvania University, a blow from
which the University never recovered. An Episcopal majority on
the Board of Columbia University rejected the proposed appointment of Professor Walter Gibbs, another Unitarian, who went on
to a distinguished career at Harvard. Fierce and continued opposition by the Presbyterians to Thomas Cooper because of his
attack on Calvinism did such damage to the College of South
Carolina that Cooper, one of the most distinguished men in
American academic life, was forced to resign. But these clouds
in the sky of freedom are not entirely without some silver lining.
Probably the most articulate and advanced rationale for academic
freedom to be expressed by an American during the pre-Civil
War period was formulated by President Cooper, then in his
seventies, and was sustained by the trustees. And although the
narrow-minded action of the majority of the Columbia trustees
was a blow to intellectual freedom at the time, the repercussions
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of the Gibbs case were momentous, and it is fair to say that the
strong position taken by the minority and its later exploitation
were responsible for the emergence of Columbia as a great
university.
Professor Metzger takes up the story with the end of the Civil
War. During the ensuing twenty-five years an evolution in American higher education took place. Ideas which had reached only
the stage of discussion in pre-Civil War days - elective subjects,
scientific courses, graduate instruction - became educational realities. The university as we know it today began to emerge and
with it the modern concept of academic freedom. Research now
assumed a place along with teaching as a major function. The
authority of religion was displaced by the methods and concepts
of science. The growth of university resources, increase in educational activities and the assemblage of large faculties led to the
establishment of rules of tenure, formal procedures for promotion and dismissal, and to delegation of authority. For the first
time the academic profession took on the character, aspirations
and standards of a learned profession.
Every revolution is born in an old regime and so with the
university revolution. In order to understand the new developments it is important to consider the problems faced by the preCivil War denominational colleges with which they were unable
to cope. Chapter VI attempts to provide this setting but unfortunately there is considerable overlapping and repetition of the
historical material already given in Part One. The Darwinian
controversy and its impact upon the academic revolution is discussed in Chapter VII. It brought new boldness into scientific
investigations. In the attack of the evolutionists upon religious
authority over education the most prominent argument was the
contention that the clergy were incompetent to judge the issues
of science. The academic freedom cases which arose from this
conflict involved many temperate evolutionists, such as James
Woodrow and Alexander Winchell, who suffered for the cause
by dismissal from their posts. In many of the eastern colleges
courses in evolution were proscribed. And as late as 1879 the
president of Yale ordered William Sumner not to use Herbert
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Spencer's Study of Sociology as a textbook. While the trend was
toward freedom its progress was slow and at times unsure.
The final stage in the academic revolution was the building
of the graduate school on the model of the German university.
The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the full impact of
the German universities with their extraordinary freedom of
inquiry (except for political questions), and Chapter VIII is
devoted to an analysis of this influence. Lehrfreheit, expressing
the German educator's concept of freedom of teaching and inquiry, became a byword in the American academic world.
Although the great contribution of the German Lehrfreheit to the
development of professorial freedom in this country is graciously
acknowledged, it is significant that the concept of academic
freedom as formulated here was substantially different from that
prevailing in the German universities. Within the academic walls
the Germans not only permitted but expected a wide latitude of
utterance. But outside the university the same degree of freedom
was not condoned, it being assumed that professors as civil servants should be circumspect and loyal, not participating in politics.
In contrast, in the classroom American professors were expected
to be neutral on controversial issues and silent on substantive
issues that lay outside the scope of their special competence.
Beyond the university, for professors in their roles as citizens,
a wider latitude of expression was permitted, apparently because
of a stronger social and constitutional commitment to the idea of
freedom of speech, and it was in this latter arena that the greater
portion of academic friction was generated.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century American business
leaders began to support universities on a scale completely without precedent, and in most of the larger gifts the initiative was
with the giver. The increased gifts brought with them an interest
in the purposes for which the funds were to be used. In constantly
increasing numbers prominent businessmen and industrial leaders
were added to the boards of trustees, until by 1900 some sixty-five
per cent of the membership consisted of businessmen, bankers
and lawyers. As compared to the German universities with faculty
control the great anomaly of American higher education has been
the domination of the professionals by laymen, and this became
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more pronounced with the passage of time. The high-handed dictation by donors to university presidents in some instances and the
supine surrender of such officials to pressure from the business
community in others led to the thesis, developed during the populist period, that businessmen and industrialists as a group were
opposed to academic freedom. Chapter X, "Academic Freedom
and Big Business," is devoted to an examination of this thesis,
and incidentally to an analysis of some of the more famous violations of academic freedom due to such interference. Illustrative
are those of Edward Ross, fired from Stanford by President David
Starr Jordan at the direction of Mrs. Leland Stanford, and of
Edward Bemis, relieved of his post at Chicago by President
Harper for his expressed views antagonistic to the railroads. But
Professor Metzger demonstrates the flaws in the thesis. Its broad
general characterization of business leaders as enemies of freedom is not supported by the evidence. While some wealthy donors
and businessmen trustees were guilty of intolerance, a notable list
of conservative trustees were in the vanguard in the battles for
academic freedom. The refusal of the Wisconsin trustees to fire
Professor Richard T. Ely because of his pro-labor views, and the
decision of the trustees of Trinity College to retain Professor
John S. Basset (author of an unpopular article on the negro problem) in the face of a tremendous pressure group, were actions of
conservative business leaders. The statements issued by the trustees in connection with their actions have been termed charters of
academic freedom. Furthermore, the economic conservatives did
not sin alone. Intolerance on the part of the populists is well
demonstrated by the vicissitudes suffered by Kansas State College
in the 1890's.
The tendencies toward professional consciousness which had
been in operation for decades culminated in the establishment in
1915 of the American Association of University Professors. This
was the beginning of an era in which the principles of academic
freedom were codified and in which violations of such freedom
were systematically investigated and penalized. The final chapter
of the book analyzes the events which brought about the A.A.U.P.,
examines its achievements during the last forty years, and explores some of the difficulties which it encountered during World
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War I. The first major accomplishment of the new association was
the "Report of Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure"
in 1915. Its fundamental premises were that:
Academic freedom was a necessary condition for a university's
existence; that trustees occupied the position of public officials discharging a public trust; that the only exception to this was when they
served private propagandistic purposes, in which cases those purposes
ought to be made explicit; that in the classroom professors were limited
to the norms of neutrality and competence; that outside the university
professors had the same right as any other citizens to freedom of
utterance and action, limited only by the obligation to observe
professional decorum. 8
In addition to these generalities the report offered practical proposals. In order to provide for some limitation on the power of
the trustees to fire teachers, it suggested trials under faculty
auspices and under a uniform procedure designed to insure due
process, and it also proposed that there should be unequivocal
understanding of the terms of every appointment. In other words,
due process and the establishment of professional competence
were necessary to academic freedom. This report, undoubtedly
one of the most comprehensive declarations of the principles of
acdemic freedom to appear in this country, became the basis
for the statement of principles of academic freedom and tenure
endorsed in later years by the Association of American Colleges,
representing college administrators, and the American Association
of University Professors. The 1940 statement, approved by both
groups, is set forth in full.4
In the other category of its activities, i.e., investigation, the
A.A.U.P. has met with somewhat less success, due in large part
to the lack of adequate resources. Funds have never been sufficient
to provide enough capable full-time personnel for the extremely
difficult job of investigation, and for the most part the Association
has had to depend upon members of Committee A, who through
the years have gratuitiously devoted enormous amounts of their
time to this work. But in the balance sheet of forty years of effort,
substantial accomplishments may be recorded. These include: the
4

Sp.480.
pp. 487-489.
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introduction of a device for fact-finding in a difficult field, and
the focusing of the light of publicity upon certain institutions
whose malpractices for years had gone unnoticed. The very threat
of investigation often proved sufficient to cause administrators to
drop contemplated questionable actions.
The crisis of World War I created new difficulties for the
academic profession. Would-be patriots became fanatics endangering all freedom. Professors were special targets in the hunt
for "slackers," "pacifists" and "pro-German sympathizers," and
they were totally unprepared to deal with this problem of loyalty
in a time of national emergency. And so it was that with the ink
hardly dry on A.A.U.P.'s bright new principles of academic freedom, they were sullied by a retreat. Confronted with the mass of
dismissals for alleged disloyalty the A.A.U.P. Committee embraced the gospel of expediency. Assuming that the war had
fundamentally changed the conditions of academic freedom it set
forth four grounds on which administrators might legitimately
dismiss professors. It accepted the premise that the university
might impose greater restrictions of speech upon its members than
the state imposed upon its citizens. This blot on the shield of the
A.A.U.P. is understandable when we consider not only the grave
national emergency and the storm of national patriotism which
swept the country, but also the infancy of the new association
with some 2000 members. It was hardly in a position to speak
with force sufficient to deter college administrators. At any rate the
damage done to freedom was not irreparable and during the intervening forty years the Association has grown in strength and prestige. Today the A.A.U.P. with more than 42,000 members is a
force of great significance in the academic world, and in recent
years it has stood staunchly for its principles in the face of the most
severe pressures. With a more sympathetic understanding of academic freedom on the part of administrators and trustees, and better
developed mechanisms for its defense, professors who have the
courage to assert themselves may well enjoy a considerable measure
of security.
Roy R. Ray*
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J.
Thomas. Dallas: S.M.U. Press, 1956. Pp. XVI, 476. $8.00.

NON-INTERVENTION.

The United States won its independence aided to a considerable
extent through the intervention of France under the Treaty of
Alliance in 1778. The treaty later became entangled in domestic
politics. Washington finally terminated it, and in his "Farewell
Address" warned his countrymen against any further "permanent
entangling alliance." From its very beginning, this country has
been plagued by intervention. Organized opinion against the prac.
tice of it, crystallizing in formal treaties and state papers as well
as in learned writings, has finally won its way.
Non-Intervention is the captivating title of a sturdy book written
by Professor A. J. Thomas and his wife, Ann Van Wynen Thomas.
It is a compendious treatise on all aspects of the practice of intervention in its various forms in modern times, its restricted place
under international law, and international efforts to eliminate, or
at least to minimize, both the policy and the practice of it in the
Twentieth Century. The treatment is divided into three major sections, each broken down into subdivisions, thus permitting more
precise allocations of topics.
A brief survey will indicate the broad scope of the subject matter. The first part is devoted to an adequate history and nature of
intervention. The second part deals with the legal aspects of individual State intervention under general international law and particular or regional international law. The scope of this part extends
to collective intervention under the United Nations Charter and
under the Charter of Organization of the American States
(O.A.S.), to collective non-intervention, and to a discussion on
self-defense and sanctions. The concluding section is an elaborate
discussion on the various grounds for intervention which States
have used as justification for their interventionary acts, such as
civil strife; the protection of life, liberty and property of citizens
abroad; the protection of democracy; humanitarian purposes, and
a few others. The section also discusses the various types of intervention such as by propaganda and by recognition of a new State,
or new government, or newly acquired territory. The work is amply
supported by copious footnote references to authorities of the high-
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est respectibility, to treaties and other state papers, and to
important judicial decisions.
Lack of space precludes consideration in detail of the many
timely questions elaborated upon in this book. Emphasis on the few
that are selected in this review is not for the purpose of indicating
priority of importance, but for expressing personal reflections.
The first part adequately surveys the history and nature of intervention, and the triumph of non-intervention in the Americas.
Washington's "Farewell Address" is germinal, for it starts an argument. Jefferson's embargo edicts, which were retaliatory acts, and
his neutrality policy seemingly invited more retaliation, until finally the War of 1812 was begun. Soon after its termination the
Latin American people gained their independence. Meanwhile the
Holy Alliance asserted a doctrine of self-protection against the
growth of republican government and the danger it posed to the
existing monarchies. Then came the announcement of the Monroe
Doctrine in 1823, the first declaration of non-intervention in the
Western Hemisphere - a stop-order on further territorial expansion and colonization in the new world. It was not a total denunciation of intervention in all its forms, or aimed at all nations, for
the United States assumed for itself the unilateral authority to
interpret the meaning of the Doctrine and to apply it in the politics
of the Americas. Europe acquiesced in this self-proclaimed trusteeship - for a while - and the Latin American Republics welcomed
the friendly protection.
While European dynasties were busy with their family quarrels
and snatching each others' thrones, the United States was nursing
a crisis which erupted in the War Between the States, and later
became involved in a war with Mexico over territory claimed by
Texas, itself a former part of Mexico. After the end of the War
Between the States, the first real test of the Monroe Doctrine occurred when the United States expelled Maximilian who had come
to Mexico and set up housekeeping in the Halls of Montezuma.
During this time some of the Republics were suffering from
civil war, insurrections, and mob violence causing destruction of
property owned by alien owners who demanded payment. Foreign
governments began to intercede for their subjects, and threatened
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to use force to collect the money. In 1868 Calvo, the great Argentine jurist, announced a second non-intervention policy, called the
Calvo Doctrine, that no State has the right to use force against another sovereign State to collect in behalf of its subjects, private
claims which arise out of violence.
Public debts mounted in a few of the Republics, fiscal administration faltered, and defaults occurred on bonds and public contracts. Again the foreigners asked their governments to intervene
and to force the payment of their claims. France, England, Germany, and Italy so acted with a show of armed force. The United
States became alarmed at this display of military intervention,
suggested a method of collecting the revenue to pay off the obligations, and the intervenors eventually accepted the plan. In the
midst of these negotiations, Louis M. Drago, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Argentina, proclaimed a doctrine - later known as the
Drago Doctrine - similar to the Calvo Doctrine, except that it
was aimed at eliminating armed or diplomatic intervention of a
foreign State to collect public debts owed to its subjects, whether
based on bonds or public contracts. These two doctrines seemed
sensible and began to attract the support of statesmen all over
the world.
President Theodore Roosevelt, who had intervened a few times
in some of the Latin American countries, and who had become
dissatisfied with methods of collecting debts due European creditors, in 1906, joined by the Czar of Russia, invited the nations to
meet at The Hague for the Second Peace Conference to discuss
this subject, together with other items. The Second, or Porter, Convention incorporated the substance of the Drago Doctrine: "The
contracting parties agree not to have recourse to armed force for
the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one
country by the government of another country as being due to its
nationals." This was subject to the condition that the debtor State
would not refuse to arbitrate or to abide by the award. This doctrine was a mile-stone toward a fuller declaration against armed
intervention. It was followed by other declarations, treaties, and
pacts, announcing a rule of general international law that intervention is illegal except for self-defense in case of attack or of
threatened attack.
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At the various International Conferences of the American States,
the delegates from the Latin American Republics repeatedly sought
to induce the United States to accept a declaration outlawing the
practice of intervention in any form or for any purpose. At last,
in the midst of their disappointment, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced in his inaugural address in 1933 the "Good Neighbor
Policy." He specified nothing in particular, but it was interpreted
as a friendly gesture, even if it was received by many Latin Americans as political platitude. At the next Conference, held in Montevideo, December, 1933, the United States accepted the principle
that "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external
affairs of another state," reserving its rights given by international
law.
Not completely satisfied with this partial adherence, the Latin
Americans submitted at Buenos Aires in December, 1936, a more
definite proposition, intended to become a treaty, stating that "intervention by any one of [the parties], directly or indirectly, for
whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs any one of the
other parties" was prohibited. This statement broadened the Drago
Doctrine substantially and impliedly incorporated that portion of
the Calvo Doctrine relating to intervention for the purpose of
collecting private debts.
The prohibition "for any and all reasons" could include intervention for self-defense, clearly conflicting with international law.
On the other hand, it could be said that the language was so broad
and general that it meant nothing in particular. Obviously it needed
specification and clarification, and these were supplied at the Ninth
Conference in 1948, in Chapter II of the Charter of the Organization of American States, sections 15 and 16. The first clause of
section 15 repeats the 1936 formula, amplified by, "The foregoing
principle prohibits not merely armed force" - which was uppermost in the thinking in 1936 - "but also any other form of interference ... against the personality of the state, or its political,
economic, or cultural elements." Section 16 denounces any kind
of economic or political coercion to obtain an advantage from
a state.
These sections are implemented by the Pact of Bogata of 1948
providing for the procedure in settling disputes and setting up the
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possible organs of administration. There is much freedom allowed
to the disputants in selecting the method for adjusting their differences, such as good offices, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration; the parties also select the members of whatever kind of tribunal is chosen. None of these organs has compulsory jurisdiction,
and the enforcement of their decision is left the party or parties
affected. Article 31 of the Pact recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all juridical disputes
relating to (1) the interpretation of a treaty, (2) any question of
international law, (3) breach of international law, and (4) the
nature and extent of reparation to be made for such breach. It is
well that the American States merely "recognize" the existence of
this jurisdiction. A dispute involving these international law
questions does not automatically go to that Court.
The Organization of American States makes the beginning of
collective intervention; but operating under the U. N. Charter, its
work in this respect may be disappointing. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) deals with mutual assistance and common
defense in case of attack, and sets up an Organ of Consultation
which is empowered to determine whatever collective measures
should be taken in case of aggression. Collective intervention is anticipated, but no administrative machinery is set up. Whatever
action is to be performed on the Organ's recommendation is
apparently left to each individual member state.
There is one clear assurance running through the Charter, the
Rio Treaty of 1947, and the Bogata Pact on the question of collective intervention that is a positive step toward international peace
and justice: all disputes and controversies between the member
States shall be referred to an appropriate Organ for settlement;
and all attacks or threats of attack by one upon another member
State shall be made a common cause of all (collective intervention) against the disturber. The very existence of these provisions
will be a patent restraint upon the desire of any government to
violate its pledge.
The Charter of the United Nations is amazingly vague on intervention. One reason for this is that the U. N. has veered away from
the established rules of international law, whereas the O.A.S. has
adhered to them. The U.N. Charter refers to international law in
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the preamble and declares it the duty of the Assembly to develop
international law,' but there is no requirement that member States
must follow it.2 The Council or the Assembly can apparently make
the law as cases or situations arise. If there is no principle of international law which the U.N. will consistently observe, except for
its own transient declarations, then it has no law at all. This condition breeds defiance and contempt, bringing humiliation to the
founders and dismay to the believers in the organization. When
Albania, having consented to abide by the decision of the International Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel Case, refused to
obey the Court's decision, and when Iraq did likewise in the oil
dispute, they considerably weakened the faith of millions of people
who had expected a respectful compliance with the Court's determinations. It may be that the Court's indecision in accepting the
evidence presented in the Corfu Channel Case had some influence
on Albania's reaction to the judgment. It still appears that the
Court was not sure of its international law - the general law or
a nascent law.
Furthermore, the United Nations was founded on a compromise
of two diametrically opposite ideological systems. The Communist
concepts of the state, law, and the international community are,
when closely analyzed, so far at variance with Western concepts,
that an irreconcilable cleavage occurred at the very inception of
the new organization.
The Soviets have a sneering contempt for Western law - it is
the product of capitalist manipulation;8 all international organizations and tribunals are "organized on the basis of modern bourgeois international law" and of imperialistic nations; the promise
of "equality of states" in international law is but a snare to "veil
the serfdom of the weak nations by the dominant classes of the
powerful nations."4
The sovereignty of the Soviet State is the supreme, absolute
authority of the proletariat, vested of course in the rulers - the
dictatorship of the proletariat. The State is independent of any
foreign control, especially of capitalist control. This means in
1

Article XIII-la.

2 THOMAS

AND THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION

105.

3 VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SoviET STATE

41bid.

235.
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practice that the Soviets must stand aloof from collaboration with
capitalist countries, lest they be controlled by them by derogating
from Soviet sovereignty; hence Soviet treaty promises are not
binding in any sense; they are mere devices to ingratiate Communists with capitalist nations in order to infiltrate and spread
their doctrines. Treaties therefore are but pretenses for intervention in foreign countries to convert them to communism, although
intervention is officially and outwardly denounced by Soviet leaders. An international organization that embraces such divergent
factors is inherently susceptible to friction and ultimate failure,
unless wholesome changes occur later to heal the cleavage.
Another indication of Soviet intransigency is vividly revealed in
rejecting the principles of international law by making detailed objections to the draft proposed by the International Law Commission to the Assembly concerning the duties of States under the
Charter, notably the duty to refrain from intervention in the affairs
of another State and to refrain from fomenting strife in other
States.5 These two duties are vital principles of international law;
they are implicit in the very idea of sovereignty, equality, and
independence of States, and of the existence of a world community. This attitude manifests plainly a clear intent not to be bound
by general international law, not to submit to the jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice, just as the Soviet Union would
not submit to the jurisdiction of the Permanent International Court
of Justice in the Eastern CarelianCase when the Court was asked
to give an advisory opinion on whether the Treaty of Dorpat between Finland and Russia regarding the autonomy of Eastern
Carelia, constituted an international engagement.' There is little
prospect that the Soviet Union will ever submit its dispute with
another State to the determination of the International Court
of Justice.
Even if the Soviet Union should submit its dispute with another
State, what assurance is there that the Court's order, if against the
Union, would be enforced? Possessing the veto power in the Council, the Union could prevent enforcement of the decree and thus
make a mockery of the whole solemn proceedings. This inherent
'THOMAS AND THOMAS, Op. cit. supra 103.
8
HuDsoN, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1218.
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weakness in enforcement procedures has been bitterly criticized by
Brierly who says that "such a system is little better than a sham;"
that "it is a mere hypocricy that the Charter should declare that
the people of the U. N. have determined to unite their strength to
maintain peace and security," yet fail to protect the little powers
against a great power.
These observations lead to the conclusion that a thorough revision of the Charter is urgently needed. This alteration cannot be
accomplished unless there is a change of political philosophy and
of regimes in Russia, for the present one has demonstrated unmistakably that its promises cannot be trusted.
The authors of this book started out to find all information that
is available on intervention and non-intervention. They have manifested an almost uncanny ability to select the pertinent issues and
rules of law involved, to assemble the material in an orderly system, and to express their conclusions in felicitous phrase and lucidity of style that induce the reader to peruse with intense pleasure
this weighty volume to the end. The task was logically planned,
systematically developed, and concluded in a manner consistent
with the high tradition of scholars who seek and find, and weigh
what they find. They had something important to say, and they have
said it clearly, vividly, and vigorously. Their book will remain a
standard treatise for a long time, and is destined to become a
classic in its field.
The foreword by Dr. Julio Cueto-Rua is a concise but scholarly
summary of current problems of research in international law and
a refreshing prelude to the development of the doctrine of nonintervention, originated and largely perfected in its present form by
Calvo and Drago of Argentina, the land of Dr. Cueto-Rua's birth.
Harvey H. Guice*

7

BRMLu.Y, LAw OF NATIONS 281-82 (4th ed. 1949).
*Professor Emeritus of Government, Southern Methodist University.

